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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of simultaneously communicating two messages, a
high-security message and a low-security message, to a legitimate receiver, referred to
as the security embedding problem. An information-theoretic formulation of the prob-
lem is presented. A coding scheme that combines rate splitting, superposition coding,
nested binning and channel prefixing is considered and is shown to achieve the secrecy
capacity region of the channel in several scenarios. Specifying these results to both scalar
and independent parallel Gaussian channels (under an average individual per-subchannel
power constraint), it is shown that the high-security message can be embedded into the
low-security message at full rate (as if the low-security message does not exist) without
incurring any loss on the overall rate of communication (as if both messages are low-
security messages). Extensions to the wiretap channel II setting of Ozarow and Wyner
are also considered, where it is shown that “perfect” security embedding can be achieved
by an encoder that uses a two-level coset code.
1 Introduction
Physical layer security has been a very active area of research in information theory. See [1]
and [2] for overviews of recent progress in this field. A basic model of physical layer security is a
wiretap/broadcast channel [3, 4] with two receivers, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper.
Both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper channels are assumed to be known at the
transmitter. By exploring the (statistical) difference between the legitimate receiver channel
and the eavesdropper channel, one may design coding schemes that can deliver a message
reliably to the legitimate receiver while keeping it asymptotically perfectly secret from the
eavesdropper.
While assuming the transmitter’s knowledge of the legitimate receiver channel might be
reasonable (particularly when a feedback link is available), assuming that the transmitter
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knows the eavesdropper channel is unrealistic in most scenarios. This is mainly because the
eavesdropper is an adversary, who usually has no incentive to help the transmitter to acquire
its channel state information. Hence, it is critical that physical layer security techniques are
designed to withstand the uncertainty of the eavesdropper channel.
In this paper, we consider a communication scenario where there are multiple possible
realizations for the eavesdropper channel. Which realization will actually occur is unknown
to the transmitter. Our goal is to design coding schemes such that the number of secure
bits delivered to the legitimate receiver depends on the actual realization of the eavesdropper
channel. More specifically, when the eavesdropper channel realization is weak, all bits delivered
to the legitimate receiver need to be secure. In addition, when the eavesdropper channel
realization is strong, a prescribed part of the bits needs to remain secure. We call such
codes security embedding codes, referring to the fact that high-security bits are now embedded
into the low-security ones. We envision that such codes are naturally useful for the secrecy
communication scenarios where the information bits are not created equal: some of them have
more security priorities than the others and hence require stronger security protections during
communication. For example, in real wireless communication systems, control plane signals
have higher secrecy requirement than data plane transmissions, and signals that carry users’
identities and cryptographic keys require stronger security protections than the other signals.
A key question that we consider is at what expense one may allow part of the bits to
enjoy stronger security protections. Note that a “naive” security embedding scheme is to
design two separate secrecy codes to provide two different levels of security protections, and
apply them to two separate parts of the information bits. In this scheme, the high-security
bits are protected using a stronger secrecy code and hence are communicated at a lower rate.
The overall communication rate is a convex combination of the low-security bit rate and the
high-security bit rate and hence is lower than the low-security bit rate. Moreover, this rate
loss becomes larger as the portion of the high-security bits becomes larger and the additional
security requirement (for the high-security bits) becomes higher.
The main result of this paper is to show that it is possible to have a significant portion
of the information bits enjoying additional security protections without sacrificing the overall
communication rate. This further justifies the name “security embedding,” as having part of
the information bits enjoying additional security protections is now only an added bonus. More
specifically, in this paper, we call a secrecy communication scenario embeddable if a nonzero
fraction of the information bits can enjoy additional security protections without sacrificing
the overall communication rate, and we call it perfectly embeddable if the high-security bits can
be communicated at full rate (as if the low-security bits do not exist) without sacrificing the
overall communication rate. Key to achieve optimal security embedding is to jointly encode the
low-security and high-security bits (as opposed to separate encoding as in the naive scheme).
In particular, the low-security bits can be used as (part of) the transmitter randomness to
protect the high-security bits (when the eavesdropper channel realization is strong); this is a
key feature of our proposed security embedding codes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we briefly review some basic results
on the secrecy capacity and optimal encoding scheme for several classical wiretap channel set-
tings. These results provide performance and structural benchmarks for the proposed security
embedding codes. In Sec. 3, an information-theoretic formulation of the security embedding
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Figure 1: Wiretap channel.
problem is presented, which we term as two-level security wiretap channel. A coding scheme
that combines rate splitting, superposition coding, nested binning and channel prefixing is
proposed and is shown to achieve the secrecy capacity region of the channel in several scenar-
ios. Based on the results of Sec. 3, in Sec. 4 we study the engineering communication models
with real channel input and additive white Gaussian noise, and show that both scalar and
independent parallel Gaussian (under an individual per-subchannel average power constraint)
two-level security wiretap channels are perfectly embeddable. In Sec. 5, we extend the results
of Sec. 3 to the wiretap channel II setting of Ozarow and Wyner [5], and show that two-level
security wiretap channels II are also pefectly embeddable. Finally, in Sec. 6, we conclude the
paper with some remarks.
2 Wiretap Channel: A Review
Consider a discrete memoryless wiretap channel with transition probability p(y, z|x), where X
is the channel input, and Y and Z are the channel outputs at the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper, respectively (see Fig. 1). The transmitter has a message M , uniformly drawn
from {1, . . . , 2nR} where n is the block length and R is the rate of communication. The message
M is intended for the legitimate receiver, but needs to be kept asymptotically perfectly secret
from the eavesdropper. Mathematically, this secrecy constraint can be written as
1
n
I(M ;Zn)→ 0 (1)
in the limit as n→∞, where Zn = (Z[1], . . . , Z[n]) is the collection of the channel outputs at
the eavesdropper during communication. A communication rate R is said to be achievable if
there exists a sequence of codes of rate R such that the message M can be reliably delivered
to the legitimate receiver while satisfying the asymptotic perfect secrecy constraint (1). The
largest achievable rate is termed as the secrecy capacity of the channel.
A discrete memoryless wiretap channel p(y, z|x) is said to be degraded if X → Y → Z
forms a Markov chain in that order. The secrecy capacity Cs of a degraded wiretap channel
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was characterized by Wyner [3] and can be written as
Cs = max
p(x)
[I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z)] (2)
where the maximization is over all possible input distributions p(x). The scheme proposed in
[3] to achieve the secrecy capacity (2) is random binning, which can be described as follows.
Consider a codebook of 2n(R+T ) codewords, each of length n. The codewords are partitioned
into 2nR bins, each containing 2nT codewords. Given a message m (which is uniformly drawn
from {1, . . . , 2nR}), the encoder randomly and uniformly chooses a codeword xn in the mth bin
and sends it through the channel. The legitimate receiver needs to decode the entire codebook
(and hence recover the transmitted message m), so the overall rate R+ T cannot be too high.
On the other hand, the rate T of the sub-codebooks in each bin represents the amount of
external randomness injected by the transmitter (transmitter randomness) into the channel
and hence needs to be sufficiently large to confuse the eavesdropper. With an appropriate
choice of the codebooks and the partitions of bins, it was shown in [3] that any communication
rate R less than the secrecy capacity (2) is achievable by the aforementioned random binning
scheme.
For a general discrete memoryless wiretap channel p(y, z|x) where the channel outputs Y
and Z are not necessarily ordered, the random binning scheme of [3] is not necessarily optimal.
In this case, the secrecy capacity Cs of the channel was characterized by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
[4] and can be written as
Cs = max
p(v,x)
[I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z)] (3)
where V is an auxiliary random variable satisfying the Markov chain V → X → (Y, Z). The
scheme proposed in [4] is to first prefix the channel input X by V and view V as the input of the
induced wiretap channel p(y, z|v) =∑x p(y, z|x)p(x|v). Applying the random binning scheme
of [3] to the induced wiretap channel p(y, z|v) proves the achievability of rate I(V ; Y )−I(V ;Z)
for any given joint auxiliary-input distribution p(v, x).
In communication engineering, communication channels are usually modeled as discrete-
time channels with real input and additive white Gaussian noise. Consider a (scalar) Gaussian
wiretap channel where the channel outputs at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are
given by
Y =
√
aX +N1
Z =
√
bX +N2.
(4)
Here, X is the channel input which is subject to the average power constraint
1
n
n∑
i=1
(X [i])2 ≤ P (5)
a and b are the channel gains for the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper channel respec-
tively, and N1 and N2 are additive white Gaussian noise with zero means and unit variances.
The secrecy capacity of the channel was characterized in [6] and can be written as
Cs(P, a, b) =
[
1
2
log(1 + aP )− 1
2
log(1 + bP )
]+
(6)
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where [x]+ := max(0, x). Note from (6) that Cs(P, a, b) > 0 if and only if a > b. That is, for
the Gaussian wiretap channel (4), asymptotic perfect secrecy communication is possible if and
only if the legitimate receiver has a larger channel gain than the eavesdropper. In this case,
we can equivalently write the channel output Z at the eavesdropper as a degraded version of
the channel output Y at the legitimate receiver, and the random binning scheme of [3] with
Gaussian codebooks and full transmit power achieves the secrecy capacity of the channel.
A closely related engineering scenario consists of a bank of L independent parallel scalar
Gaussian wiretap channels [7]. In this scenario, the channel outputs at the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper are given by Y = (Y1, . . . , YL) and Z = (Z1, . . . , ZL) where
Yl =
√
alXl +N1,l
Zl =
√
blXl +N2,l
, l = 1, . . . , L. (7)
Here, Xl is the channel input for the lth subchannel, al and bl are the channel gains for the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper channel respectively in the lth subchannel, and N1,l
and N2,l are additive white Gaussian noise with zero means and unit variances. Furthermore,
(N1,l, N2,l) are independent for l = 1, . . . , L so all L subchannels are independent of each other.
Two different types of power constraints have been considered: the average individual
per-subchannel power constraint
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Xl[i])
2 ≤ Pl, l = 1, . . . , L (8)
and the average total power constraint
L∑
l=1
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Xl[i])
2
]
≤ P. (9)
Under the average individual per-subchannel power constraint (8), the secrecy capacity of the
independent parallel Gaussian wiretap channel (7) is given by [7]
Cs({Pl, al, bl}Ll=1) =
L∑
l=1
Cs(Pl, al, bl) (10)
where Cs(P, a, b) is defined as in (6). Clearly, any communication rate less than the secrecy
capacity (10) can be achieved by using L separate scalar Gaussian wiretap codes, each for one
of the L subchannels. The secrecy capacity, Cs(P, {al, bl}Ll=1), under the average total power
constraint (9) is given by
Cs(P, {al, bl}Ll=1) = max
(P1,...,PL)
L∑
l=1
Cs(Pl, al, bl) (11)
where the maximization is over all possible power allocations (P1, . . . , PL) such that
∑L
l=1 Pl ≤
P . A waterfilling-like solution for the optimal power allocation was derived in [7, Th. 1], which
provides an efficient way to numerically calculate the secrecy capacity Cs(P, {al, bl}Ll=1).
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3 Two-Level Security Wiretap Channel
3.1 Channel Model
Consider a discrete memoryless broadcast channel with three receivers and transition proba-
bility p(y, z1, z2|x). The receiver that receives the channel output Y is a legitimate receiver.
The receivers that receive the channel outputs Z1 and Z2 are two possible realizations of an
eavesdropper. Assume that the channel output Z2 is degraded with respect to the channel
output Z1, i.e.,
X → Z1 → Z2 (12)
forms a Markov chain in that order. Therefore, the receiver that receives the channel output
Z1 represents a stronger realization of the eavesdropper channel than the receiver that receives
the channel output Z2.
The transmitter has two independent messages: a high-security message M1 uniformly
drawn from {1, . . . , 2nR1} and a low-security message M2 uniformly drawn from {1, . . . , 2nR2}.
Here, n is the block length, and R1 and R2 are the corresponding rates of communication.
Both messages M1 and M2 are intended for the legitimate receiver, and need to be kept
asymptotically perfectly secure when the eavesdropper realization is weak, i.e.,
1
n
I(M1,M2;Z
n
2 )→ 0 (13)
in the limit as n → ∞. In addition, when the eavesdropper realization is strong, the high-
security message M1 needs to remain asymptotically perfectly secure, i.e.,
1
n
I(M1;Z
n
1 )→ 0 (14)
in the limit as n → ∞. A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if there is a sequence of
codes of rate pair (R1, R2) such that both messages M1 and M2 can be reliably delivered to the
legitimate receiver while satisfying the asymptotic perfect secrecy constraints (13) and (14).
The collection of all possible achievable rate pairs is termed as the secrecy capacity region of
the channel. Fig. 2 illustrates this communication scenario, which we term as two-level security
wiretap channel.
The above setting of two-level security wiretap channel is closely related to the traditional
wiretap channel setting of [3, 4]. More specifically, without the additional secrecy constraint
(14) on the high-security message M1, we can simply view the messages M1 and M2 as a single
(low-security) message M with rate R1 + R2. And the problem reduces to communicating
the message M over the traditional wiretap channel with transition probability p(y, z2|x) =∑
z1
p(y, z1, z2|x). By the secrecy capacity expression (3), the maximum achievable R1 +R2 is
given by
max
p(v,x)
[I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z2)] (15)
where V is an auxiliary random variable satisfying the Markov chain V → X → (Y, Z2). Simi-
larly, without needing to communicate the low-security message M2 (i.e., R2 = 0), the secrecy
constraint (14) reduces to (1/n)I(M1;Z
n
2 )→ 0 which is implied by the secrecy constraint (13)
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Figure 2: Two-level security wiretap channel.
since I(M1;Z
n
2 ) ≤ I(M1;Zn1 ) due to the Markov chain (12). In this case, the problem reduces
to communicating the high-security message M1 over the traditional wiretap channel with
transition probability p(y, z1|x) =
∑
z2
p(y, z1, z2|x). Again, by the secrecy capacity expression
(3), the maximum achievable R1 is given by
max
p(w,x)
[I(W ; Y )− I(W ;Z1)] (16)
where W is an auxiliary random variable satisfying the Markov chain W → X → (Y, Z1).
Based on the above connections, we may conclude that a two-level security wiretap channel
p(y, z1, z2|x) is embeddable if there exists a sequence of coding schemes with a rate pair (R1, R2)
such that R1 +R2 is equal to (15) and R1 > 0, and it is perfectly embeddable if there exists a
sequence of coding schemes with a rate pair (R1, R2) such that R1 + R2 is equal to (15) and
R1 is equal to (16).
An important special case of the two-level security wiretap channel problem considered
here is when the channel output Z2 is a constant signal. In this case, the secrecy constraint
(13) becomes obsolete, and the low-security message M2 becomes a regular message without
any secrecy constraint. The problem of simultaneously communicating a regular message and
a confidential message over a discrete memoryless wiretap channel was first considered in [8],
where a single-letter characterization of the capacity region was established. For the general
two-level security wiretap channel problem that we consider here, both high-security message
M1 and low-security message M2 are subject to asymptotic perfect secrecy constraints, which
makes the problem potentially much more involved.
3.2 Main Results
The following theorem provides two sufficient conditions for establishing the achievability of
a rate pair for a given discrete memoryless two-level security wiretap channel.
7
Theorem 1. Consider a discrete memoryless two-level security wiretap channel with transition
probability p(y, z1, z2|x) that satisfies the Markov chain (12). A nonnegative pair (R1, R2) is
an achievable rate pair of the channel if it satisfies
R1 ≤ I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z1)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z2) (17)
for some input distribution p(x). More generally, a nonnegative pair (R1, R2) is an achievable
rate pair of the channel if it satisfies
R1 ≤ I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z1|U)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z2) (18)
for some joint distribution p(u, v, x), where U and V are auxiliary random variables satisfying
the Markov chain U → V → X → (Y, Z1, Z2) and such that I(U ; Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z2).
Clearly, the sufficient condition (17) can be obtained from (18) by choosing V = X and U
to be a constant. Hence, (18) is a more general sufficient condition than (17). The sufficient
condition (17) can be proved by considering a nested binning scheme that uses the low-security
message M2 as part of the transmitter randomness to protect the high-security message M1
(when the eavesdropper channel realization is strong). The more general sufficient condition
(18) can be proved by considering a more complex coding scheme that combines rate splitting,
superposition coding, nested binning and channel prefixing. A detailed proof of the theorem
is provided in Sec. 3.3.
The following corollary provides sufficient conditions for establishing that a two-level se-
curity wiretap channel is (perfectly) embeddable. The conditions are given in terms of the
existence of a joint auxiliary-input random triple and are immediate consequences of Theo-
rem 1.
Corollary 2. A two-level security wiretap channel p(y, z1, z2|x) is embeddable if there exists
a pair of auxiliary random variables U and V satisfying the Markov chain U → V → X →
(Y, Z1, Z2) and such that I(U ; Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z2), p(v, x) is an optimal solution to the maximization
program (15), and I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z1|U) > 0, and it is perfectly embeddable if there exists
a pair of auxiliary random variables U and V satisfying the Markov chain U → V → X →
(Y, Z1, Z2) and such that I(U ; Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z2), p(v, x) is an optimal solution to the maximization
program (15), and I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z1|U) is equal to (16).
If, in addition to the Markov chain (12), we also have the Markov chain
X → Y → Z2 (19)
in that order, the sufficient condition (18) is also necessary, leading to a precise characterization
of the secrecy capacity region. The results are summarized in the following theorem; a proof
of the theorem can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 3. Consider a discrete memoryless two-level security wiretap channel with transition
probability p(y, z1, z2|x) that satisfies the Markov chains (12) and (19). The secrecy capacity
region of the channel is given by the set of all nonnegative pairs that satisfy (18) for some joint
distribution p(u, v, x), where U and V are auxiliary random variables satisfying the Markov
chain U → V → X → (Y, Z1, Z2).
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Figure 3: Codebook structure for the nested binning scheme.
If, in addition to the Markov chains (12) and (19), we also have the Markov chain
X → Y → Z1 (20)
in that order, the (weaker) sufficient condition (17) also becomes necessary, leading to a simpler
characterization of the secrecy capacity region (which does not involve any auxiliary random
variables). The results are summarized in the following theorem; a proof of the theorem can
be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 4. Consider a discrete memoryless two-level security wiretap channel with transition
probability p(y, z1, z2|x) that satisfies the Markov chains (12), (19) and (20). The secrecy
capacity region of the channel is given by the set of all nonnegative pairs that satisfy (17) for
some input distribution p(x).
3.3 Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove the weaker sufficient condition (17) by considering a nested binning scheme that
uses the low-security message M2 as part of the transmitter randomness to protect the high-
security message M1 (when the eavesdropper channel realization is strong). We shall consider
a random-coding argument, which can be described as follows.
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Fix an input distribution p(x).
Codebook generation. Randomly and independently generate 2n(R1+R2+T ) codewords of
length n according to an n-product of p(x). Randomly partition the codewords into 2nR1 bins
so each bin contains 2n(R2+T ) codewords. Further partition each bin into 2nR2 subbins so each
subbin contains 2nT codewords. Label the codewords as xnj,k,l where j denotes the bin number,
k denotes the subbin number within each bin, and l denotes the codeword number within each
subbin. See Fig. 3 for an illustration of the codebook structure.
Encoding. To send a message pair (m1, m2), the transmitter randomly (according to a
uniform distribution) chooses a codeword xnm1,m2,t from the subbin identified by (m1, m2) and
sends it through the channel.
Decoding at the legitimate receiver. Given the channel outputs yn, the legitimate receiver
looks into the codebook {xnj,k,l}j,k,l and searches for a codeword that is jointly typical [9] with
yn. In the case when
R1 +R2 + T < I(X ; Y ) (21)
with high probability the transmitted codeword xnm1,m2,t is the only one that is jointly typical
with yn (and hence can be correctly decoded).
Security at the eavesdropper. Note that each bin corresponds to a message m1 and contains
2n(R2+T ) codewords, each randomly and independently generated according to an n-product of
p(x). For a given message m1, the transmitted codeword is randomly and uniformly chosen
from the corresponding bin (where the randomness is from both the low-security message M2
and the transmitter’s choice of t). Following [3], in the case when
R2 + T > I(X ;Z1) (22)
we have (1/n)I(M1;Z
n
1 ) tends to zero in the limit as n → 0. Furthermore, each subbin
corresponds to a message pair (m1, m2) and contains 2
nT codewords, each randomly and in-
dependently generated according to an n-product of p(x). For a given message pair (m1, m2),
the transmitted codeword is randomly and uniformly chosen from the corresponding subbin
(where the randomness is from the transmitter’s choice of t). Again, following [3], in the case
when
T > I(X ;Z2) (23)
we have (1/n)I(M1,M2;Z
n
2 ) tends to zero in the limit as n→ 0.
Eliminating T from (21)–(23) using Fourier-Motzkin elimination, we can conclude that any
rate pair (R1, R2) that satisfies (17) is achievable.
Next we prove the more general sufficient condition (18) by considering a coding scheme
that combines rate splitting, superposition coding, nested binning and channel prefixing. We
shall once again resort to a random-coding argument, which can be described as follows.
Fix a joint auxiliary-input distribution p(u)p(v|u)p(x|v) with I(U ; Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z2) and ǫ > 0.
Split the low-security message M2 into two independent submessages M
′
2 and M
′′
2 with rates
R′2 and R
′′
2, respectively.
Codebook generation. Randomly and independently generate 2n(R
′
2
+I(U ;Z2)+ǫ) codewords of
length n according to an n-product of p(u). Randomly partition the codewords into 2nR
′
2 bins
so each bin contains 2n(I(U ;Z2)+ǫ) codewords. Label the codewords as unj,k where j denotes
10
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Figure 4: Codebook structure for a coding scheme that combines rate splitting, superposition
coding and nested binning.
the bin number, and k denotes the codeword number within each bin. We shall refer to the
codeword collection {unj,k}j,k as the U -codebook.
For each codeword unj,k in the U -codebook, randomly and independently generate 2
n(R1+R′′2+T )
codewords of length n according to an n-product of p(v|u). Randomly partition the codewords
into 2nR1 bins so each bin contains 2n(R
′′
2
+T ) codewords. Further partition each bin into 2nR
′′
2
subbins so each subbin contains 2nT codewords. Label the codewords as vnj,k,l,p,q where (j, k)
indicates the base codeword unj,k from which v
n
j,k,l,p,q was generated, l denotes the bin number,
p denotes the subbin number within each bin, and q denotes the codeword number within
each subbin. We shall refer to the codeword collection {vnj,k,l,p,q}l,p,q as the V -subcodebook
corresponding to base codeword unj,k. See Fig. 4 for an illustration of the codebook structure.
Encoding. To send a message triple (m1, m
′
2, m
′′
2), the transmitter randomly (according a
uniform distribution) chooses a codeword un
m′
2
,t2
from the m′2th bin in the U -codebook. Once
a un
m′
2
,t2
is chosen, the transmitter looks into the V -subcodebook corresponding to un
m′
2
,t2
and
randomly chooses a codeword vnm′
2
,t2,m1,m
′′
2
,t1
from the subbin identified by (m1, m
′′
2). Once a
vn
m′
2
,t2,m1,m
′′
2
,t1
is chosen, an input sequence xn is generated according to an n-product of p(x|v)
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and is then sent through the channel.
Decoding at the legitimate receiver. Given the channel outputs yn, the legitimate re-
ceiver looks into the U -codebook and its V -codebooks and searches for a pair of codewords
(unj,k, v
n
j,k,l,p,q) that are jointly typical [9] with y
n. In the case when
R′2 + I(U ;Z2) + ǫ < I(U ; Y ) (24)
and R1 +R
′′
2 + T < I(V ; Y |U) (25)
with high probability the codeword pair selection (unm′
2
,t2
, vnm′
2
,t2,m1,m
′′
2
,t1
) is the only one that is
jointly typical [9] with yn.
Security at the eavesdropper. To analyze the security of the high-security message M1 and
the submessage M ′′2 at the eavesdropper, we shall assume (for now) that both the submessage
m′2 and the codeword selection u
n
m′
2
,t2
are known at the eavesdropper. Note that such an
assumption can only strengthen our security analysis. Given the base codeword unm′
2
,t2
, the
encoding of m1 and m
′′
2 using the corresponding V -subcodebook is identical to the nested
binning scheme considered previously (with additional channel prefixing). Thus in the case
when
R′′2 + T > I(V ;Z1|U) (26)
and T > I(V ;Z2|U) (27)
we have
1
n
I(M1;Z
n
1 |M ′2) =
1
n
I(M1;Z
n
1 ,M
′
2) → 0 (28)
and
1
n
I(M1,M
′′
2 ;Z
n
2 |M ′2) =
1
n
I(M1,M
′′
2 ;Z
n
2 ,M
′
2) → 0 (29)
in the limit as n→∞. The equalities in (28) and (29) are due to the fact that (M1,M ′′2 ) and
M ′2 are independent. From (28) we may conclude that (1/n)I(M1;Z
n
1 ) → 0 in the limit as
n→∞.
To analyze the security of the submessage M ′2, note that each bin in the U -codebook
corresponds to a message m′2 and contains 2
n(R′
2
+I(U ;Z2)+ǫ) codewords, each randomly and
independently generated according to an n-product of p(u). For a given submessage m′2, the
codeword unm′
2
,t2
is randomly and uniformly chosen from the corresponding bin (where the
randomness is from the transmitter’s choice of t2). Note from (27) that the rate of each
V -subcodebook is greater than I(V ;Z2|U). Following [10, Lemma 1], we have
1
n
I(M ′2;Z
n
2 )→ 0 (30)
in the limit as n→∞. Putting together (29) and (30), we have
1
n
I(M1,M2;Z
n
2 ) =
1
n
I(M1,M
′
2,M
′′
2 ;Z
n
2 )
=
1
n
I(M ′2;Z
n
2 ) +
1
n
I(M1,M
′′
2 ;Z
n
2 |M ′2)
12
which tends to zero in the limit as n→∞.
Finally, note that the overall communicate rate R2 of the low-security message M2 is given
by
R2 = R
′
2 +R
′′
2 . (31)
Eliminating T , R′2 and R
′′
2 from (24)–(27), (31), and R
′
2, R
′′
2 ≥ 0 using Fourier-Motzkin elim-
ination, simplifying the results using the facts that 1) I(U ; Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z2), 2) I(V ;Z2|U) ≤
I(V ;Z1|U) which is due to the Markov chain (12), and 3) I(V ; Y |U)+ I(U ; Y ) = I(V, U ; Y ) =
I(V ; Y ) and I(V ;Z2|U) + I(U ;Z2) = I(V, U ;Z2) = I(V ;Z2) which are due to the Markov
chain U → V → X → (Y, Z1, Z2), and letting ǫ → 0, we may conclude that any rate pair
(R1, R2) satisfying (18) is achievable. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
4 Gaussian Two-Level Security Wiretap Channels
4.1 Scalar Channel
Consider a discrete-time two-level security wiretap channel with real input X and outputs Y ,
Z1 and Z2 given by
Y =
√
aX +N1
Z1 =
√
b1X +N2
Z2 =
√
b2X +N3
(32)
where a, b1 and b2 are the corresponding channel gains, and N1, N2 and N3 are additive white
Gaussian noise with zero means and unit variances. Assume that b1 ≥ b2 so the receiver that
receives the channel output Z1 represents a stronger realization of the eavesdropper channel
than the receiver that receives the channel output Z2. The channel input X is subject to the
average power constraint (5).
We term the above communication scenario as (scalar) Gaussian two-level security wiretap
channel. The following theorem provides an explicit characterization of the secrecy capacity
region.
Theorem 5. Consider the (scalar) Gaussian two-level security wiretap channel (32). The
secrecy capacity region of the channel is given by the collection of all nonnegative pairs (R1, R2)
that satisfy
R1 ≤ Cs(P, a, b1)
and R1 +R2 ≤ Cs(P, a, b2) (33)
where Cs(P, a, b) is defined as in (6).
Proof: We first prove the converse part of the theorem. Recall from Sec. 3.1 that without
transmitting the low-security messageM2 (which can only increase the achievable rate R1), the
problem reduces to communicating the high-security message M1 over the traditional wiretap
channel p(y, z1|x). For the Gaussian two-level security wiretap channel (32), the problem
reduces to communicating the high-security message M1 over the Gaussian wiretap channel
with channel outputs Y and Z1 given by
Y =
√
aX +N1
Z1 =
√
b1X +N2.
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We thus conclude that R1 ≤ Cs(P, a, b1) for any achievable rate R1.
Similarly, ignoring the additional secrecy constraint (14) for the high-security message
M1 (which can only enlarge the achievable rate region {(R1, R2)}), we can simply view the
messages M1 and M2 as a single message M with rate R1 + R2. In this case, the problem
reduces to communicating the message M over the traditional wiretap channel p(y, z2|x). For
the Gaussian two-level security wiretap channel (32), the problem reduces to communicating
the message M over the Gaussian wiretap channel with channel outputs Y and Z2 given by
Y =
√
aX +N1
Z2 =
√
b2X +N3.
We thus conclude that R1 +R2 ≤ Cs(P, a, b2) for any achievable rate pair (R1, R2).
To show that any nonnegative pair (R1, R2) that satisfies (33) is achievable, let us first
consider two simple cases. First, when b1 ≥ b2 ≥ a, both Cs(P, a, b1) and Cs(P, a, b2) are equal
to zero (c.f. definition (6)). So (33) does not include any positive rate pairs and hence there is
nothing to prove. Next, when b1 ≥ a ≥ b2, Cs(P, a, b1) = 0 and (33) reduces to
R1 = 0
and R2 ≤ Cs(P, a, b2).
Since the high-security message M1 does not need to be transmitted, any rate pair in this
region can be achieved by using a scalar Gaussian wiretap code to encode the low-security
message M2. This has left us with the only case with a ≥ b1 ≥ b2.
For the case where a ≥ b1 ≥ b2, the achievability of any rate pair in (33) follows from that
of (17) by choosing X to be Gaussian with zero mean and variance P . This completes the
proof of the theorem. 
The following corollary follows directly from the achievability of the corner point
(R1, R2) = (Cs(P, a, b1), Cs(P, a, b2)− Cs(P, a, b1)) (34)
of (33).
Corollary 6. Scalar Gaussian two-level security wiretap channels under an average power
constraint are perfectly embeddable.
Fig. 5 illustrates the secrecy capacity region (33) for the case where a > b1 > b2. Also
plotted in the figure is the rate region that can be achieved by the naive scheme that uses two
Gaussian wiretap codes to encode the messages M1 and M2 separately. Note that the corner
point (34) is strictly outside the “naive” rate region, which illustrates the superiority of nested
binning over the separate coding scheme.
4.2 Independent Parallel Channel
Consider a discrete-time two-level security wiretap channel which consists of a bank of L
independent parallel scalar Gaussian two-level security wiretap channels. In this model, the
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R1
R2
0
Cs(P, a, b1)
Cs(P, a, b2)
(Cs(P, a, b1), Cs(P, a, b2)− Cs(P, a, b1))
Figure 5: Secrecy capacity region of the scalar Gaussian two-level security wiretap channel
(a > b1 > b2). The rate region under the dashed line can be achieved by separate encoding of
M1 and M2.
channel outputs are given by Y = (Y1, . . . , YL), Z1 = (Z1,1, . . . , Z1,L) and Z2 = (Z2,1, . . . , Z2,L)
where
Yl =
√
a1Xl +N1,l
Z1,l =
√
b1,lXl +N2,l
Z2,l =
√
b2,lXl +N3,l
l = 1, . . . , L. (35)
Here, Xl is the channel input for the lth subchannel, al, b1,l and b2,l are the corresponding
channel gains in the lth subchannel, and N1,l, N2,l and N3,l are additive white Gaussian noise
with zero means and unit variances. We assume that b1,l ≥ b2,l for all l = 1, . . . , L, so the
receiver that receives the channel output Z1 represents a stronger realization of the eavesdrop-
per channel in each of the L subchannels than the receiver that receives the channel output
Z2. Furthermore, (N1,l, N2,l, N3,l), l = 1, . . . , L, are independent so all L subchannels are
independent of each other.
We term the above communication scenario as independent parallel Gaussian two-level
security wiretap channel. The following theorem provides an explicit characterization of the
secrecy capacity region under an average individual per-subchannel power constraint.
Theorem 7. Consider the independent parallel Gaussian two-level security wiretap channel
(35) where the channel input X is subject to the average individual per-subchannel power con-
straint (8). The secrecy capacity region of the channel is given by the collection of all nonneg-
ative pairs (R1, R2) that satisfy
R1 ≤
∑L
l=1Cs(Pl, al, b1,l)
and R1 +R2 ≤
∑L
l=1Cs(Pl, al, b2,l)
(36)
where Cs(P, a, b) is defined as in (6).
15
Proof: We first prove the converse part of the theorem. Following the same argument as
that for Theorem 5, we can show that
R1 ≤ Cs({Pl, al, b1,l}Ll=1)
and R1 +R2 ≤ Cs({Pl, al, b2,l}Ll=1) (37)
for any achievable secrecy rate pair (R1, R2). By the secrecy capacity expression (10) for the
independent parallel Gaussian wiretap channel under an average individual per-subchannel
power constraint, we have
Cs({Pl, al, b1,l}Ll=1) =
∑L
l=1Cs(Pl, al, b1,l)
and Cs({Pl, al, b2,l}Ll=1) =
∑L
l=1Cs(Pl, al, b2,l).
(38)
Substituting (38) into (37) proves the converse part of the theorem.
To show that any nonnegative pair (R1, R2) that satisfies (36) is achievable, let us consider
independent coding over each of the L subchannels. Note that each subchannel is a scalar
Gaussian two-level security wiretap channel with average power constraint Pl and channel
gains (al, b1,l, b2,l). Thus, by Theorem 5, any nonnegative pair (R1,l, R2,l) that satisfies
R1,l ≤ Cs(Pl, al, b1,l)
and R1,l + R2,l ≤ Cs(Pl, al, b2,l) (39)
is achievable for the lth subchannel. The overall communication rates are given by
R1 =
∑L
l=1R1,l
and R2 =
∑L
l=1R2,l.
(40)
Substituting (39) into (40) proves that any nonnegative pair (R1, R2) that satisfies (36) is
achievable. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
Similar to the scalar case, the following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 7.
Corollary 8. Independent parallel Gaussian two-level security wiretap channels under an av-
erage individual per-subchannel power constraint are perfectly embeddable.
The secrecy capacity region of the channel under an average total power constraint is
summarized in the following corollary. The results follow from the well-known fact that an
average total power constraint can be written as the union of average individual per-subchannel
power constraints, where the union is over all possible power allocations among the subchannels.
Corollary 9. Consider the independent parallel Gaussian two-level security wiretap channel
(35) where the channel input X is subject to the average total power constraint (9). The secrecy
capacity region of the channel is given by the collection of all nonnegative pair (R1, R2) that
satisfies
R1 ≤
∑L
l=1Cs(Pl, al, b1,l)
and R1 +R2 ≤
∑L
l=1Cs(Pl, al, b2,l)
(41)
for some power allocation (P1, . . . , PL) such that
∑L
l=1 Pl ≤ P .
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Figure 6: Secrecy capacity region of the independent parallel Gaussian two-level security wire-
tap channel under an average total power constraint. The intersection of the dashed lines are
outside the secrecy capacity region, indicating that the channel is not perfectly embeddable.
Fig. 6 illustrates the secrecy capacity with L = 2 subchannels where
a1 = 1.000, b1,1 = 0.800, b2,1 = 0.100
a2 = 1.000, b1,2 = 0.250, b2,2 = 0.100
and P = 1.000.
As we can see, under the average total power constraint (9), the independent parallel Gaussian
two-level security wiretap channel is embeddable but not perfectly embeddable. The reason
is that the optimal power allocation (P1, P2) that maximizes Cs(P1, a1, b2,1) +Cs(P2, a2, b2,2) is
suboptimal in maximizing Cs(P1, a1, b1,1) + Cs(P2, a2, b1,2). By comparison, under the average
individual per-subchannel power constraint (8), the power allocated to each of the subchannels
is fixed so the channel is always perfectly embeddable.
5 Two-Level Security Wiretap Channel II
In Sec. 2 we briefly summarized the known results on a classical secrecy communication setting
known as wiretap channel. A closely related classical secrecy communication scenario is wiretap
channel II, which was first studied by Ozarow and Wyner [5]. In the wiretap channel II setting,
the transmitter sends a binary sequence Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) of length n noiselessly to an
legitimate receiver. The signal Zn = (Z1, . . . , Zn) received at the eavesdropper is given by
Zi =
{
Xi, i ∈ S
e, otherwise
where e represents an erasure output, and S is a subset of {1, . . . , n} of size nα representing
the locations of the transmitted bits that can be accessed by the eavesdropper.
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If the subset S is known at the transmitter, a message M of n(1−α) bits can be noiselessly
communicated to the legitimate receiver throughXSc := {Xi : i ∈ Sc}. Since the eavesdropper
has no information regarding to XSc , perfectly secure communication is achieved without any
coding. It is easy to see that in this scenario, n(1 − α) is also the maximum number of bits
that can be reliably and perfectly securely communicated through n transmitted bits.
An interesting result of [5] is that for any ǫ > 0, a total of n(1−α−ǫ) bits can be reliably and
asymptotically perfectly securely communicated to the legitimate receiver even when the subset
S is unknown (but with a fixed size nα) a priori at the transmitter. Here, by “asymptotically
perfectly securely” we mean (1/n)I(M ;Zn)→ 0 in the limit as n→∞. Unlike the case where
the subset S is known , coding is necessary when S is unknown a priori at the transmitter. In
particular, [5] considered a random binning scheme that partitions the collection of all length-
n binary sequences into an appropriately chosen group code and its cosets. For the wiretap
channel setting, as shown in Sec. 3, a random binning scheme can be easily modified into a
nested binning scheme to efficiently embed high-security bits into low-security ones. The main
goal of this section is to extend this result from the classical setting of wiretap channel to
wiretap channel II.
More specifically, assume that a realization of the subset S has two possible sizes, nα1
and nα2, where 1 ≥ α1 ≥ α2 ≥ 0. The transmitter has two independent messages, the high-
security message M1 and the low-security message M2, uniformly drawn from {1, . . . , 2nR1}
and {1, . . . , 2nR2} respectively. When the size of the realization S is nα2, both messages M1
and M2 need to be secure, i.e., (1/n)I(M1,M2;Z
n) → 0 in the limit as n → ∞. In addition,
when the size of the realization of S is nα1, the high-security message M1 needs to remain
secure, i.e., (1/n)I(M1;Z
n)→ 0 in the limit as n→∞. We term this communication scenario
as two-level security wiretap channel II, in line with our previous terminology in Sec. 3.
By the results of [3], without needing to communicate the low-security message M2, the
maximum achievable R1 is 1−α1. Without the additional secrecy constraint (1/n)I(M1;Zn)→
0 on the high-security message M1, the messages (M1,M2) can be viewed as a single message
M with rate R1 + R2, and the maximum achievable R1 + R2 is 1 − α2. The main result of
this section is to show that the rate pair (1− α1, α1 −α2) is indeed achievable, from which we
may conclude that two-level security wiretap channels II are perfectly embeddable. Moreover,
perfect embedding can be achieved by a nested binning scheme that uses a two-level coset
code. The results are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Two-level security wiretap channels II are perfectly embeddable. Moreover,
perfect embedding can be achieved by a nested binning scheme that uses a two-level coset code.
Proof: Fix ǫ > 0. Consider a binary parity-check matrix
H =
[
H1
H2
]
where the size of H1 is n(1− α1 − ǫ)× n and the size of H2 is n(α1 − α2)× n. Let s1(·) be a
one-on-one mapping between {1, . . . , 2n(1−α1−ǫ)} and the binary vectors of length n(1−α1− ǫ),
and let s2(·) be a one-on-one mapping between M2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(α1−α2)} and the binary vectors
of length n(α1 − α2).
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For a given message pair (m1, m2), the transmitter randomly (according to a uniform
distribution) chooses a solution xn to the linear equations
(xn)tH = (xn)t
[
H1
H2
]
=
[
s1(m1)
s2(m2)
]
(42)
and sends it to the legitimate receiver.
When the parity-check matrixH has full (row) rank, the above encoding procedure is equiv-
alent of a nested binning scheme that partitions the collection of all length-n binary sequences
into bins and subbins using a two-level coset code with parity-check matrices (H1, H2). More-
over, let b1, . . . , bn be the columns of H and let Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Define D2(Γ) as the dimension
of the subspace spanned by {bi : i ∈ Γ} and
D∗2 := min
|Γ|=n(1−α2)
D2(Γ).
When the size of the realization of S is nα2, by [5, Lemma 4] we have
H(M1,M2|Zn) = D∗2. (43)
Note that the low-security message M2 is uniformly drawn from {1, . . . , 2n(α1−α2)}. So by
(42), for a given high-security message m1, the transmitted sequence x
n is randomly chosen
(according to a uniform distribution) as a solution to the linear equations (xn)tH1 = s1(m1).
If we let a1, . . . , an be the columns of H1 and define
D∗1 := min
|Γ|=n(1−α1)
D1(Γ)
where D1(Γ) is the dimension of the subspace spanned by {ai : i ∈ Γ}, we have again from [5,
Lemma 4]
H(M1|Zn) = D∗1 (44)
when the size of the realization of S is nα1.
Let Ψ(H) = 1 when we have either H does not have full rank, or D∗2 < n(1−α2− ǫ)− 3/ǫ,
or D∗1 < n(1 − α1 − ǫ) − 3/ǫ, and let Ψ(H) = 0 otherwise. By using a randomized argument
that generates the entries of H independently according to a uniform distribution in {0, 1},
we can show that there exists an H with Ψ(H) = 0 for sufficiently large n (see Appendix C
for details). For such an H , we have from (43) and (44) that (1/n)I(M1,M2;Z
n) ≤ 3/(nǫ)
when the size of the realization of S is nα2, and (1/n)I(M1;Z
n) ≤ 3/(nǫ) when the size of the
realization of S is nα1.
Letting n → ∞ and ǫ → 0 (in that order) proves the achievability of the rate pair (1 −
α1, α1 − α2) and hence completes the proof of the theorem. 
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we considered the problem of simultaneously communicating two messages, a
high-security message and a low-security message, to a legitimate receiver, referred to as the
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security embedding problem. An information-theoretic formulation of the problem was pre-
sented. With appropriate coding architectures, it was shown that a significant portion of the
information bits can receive additional security protections without sacrificing the overall rate
of communication. Key to achieve efficient embedding was to use the low-security message as
part of the transmitter randomness to protect the high-security message when the eavesdropper
channel realization is strong.
For the engineering communication scenarios with real channel input and additive white
Gaussian noise, it was shown that the high-security message can be embedded into the low-
security message at full rate without incurring any loss on the overall rate of communication
for both scalar and independent parallel Gaussian channels (under an average individual per-
subchannel power constraint). The scenarios with multiple transmit and receive antennas are
considerably more complex and hence require further investigations.
Finally, note that even though in this paper we have only considered providing two levels
of security protections to the information bits, most of the results extend to multiple-level
security in the most straightforward fashion. In the limit when the security levels change
continuously, the number of secure bits delivered to the legitimate receiver would depend on
the realization of the eavesdropper channel even though such realizations are unknown a priori
at the transmitter.
A Proof of Theorem 3
First note that when X → Y → Z2 forms a Markov chain in that order, we have I(U ; Y ) ≥
I(U ;Z2) for any jointly distributed (U, V,X) that satisfies the Markov chain U → V → X →
(Y, Z1, Z2).
To show that the sufficient condition (18) is also necessary, let (R1, R2) be an achievable
rate pair. Following Fano’s inequality [9] and the asymptotic perfect secrecy constraints (13)
and (14), there exists a sequence of codes (indexed by the block length n) of rate pair (R1, R2)
such that
H(M1,M2|Y n) ≤ nǫn/2 (45)
I(M1;Z
n
1 ) ≤ nǫn/2 (46)
and I(M1,M2;Z
n
2 ) ≤ nǫn/2 (47)
where ǫn → 0 in the limit as n→∞.
Following (45) and (46), we have
n(R1 − ǫn) = H(M1)− nǫn
≤ H(M1)− [I(M1;Zn1 ) +H(M1,M2|Y n)]
= H(M1|Zn1 )−H(M1,M2|Y n)
≤ H(M1,M2|Zn1 )−H(M1,M2|Y n)
= I(M1,M2; Y
n)− I(M1,M2;Zn2 ).
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Let M := (M1,M2), Y
i−1 := (Y [1], . . . , Y [i − 1]), Zn1,i+1 = (Z1[i + 1], ..., Z1[n]) and U [i] :=
(Y i−1, Zn1,i+1). We further have
n(R1 − ǫn) ≤ I(M ; Y n)− I(M ;Zn1 )
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ; Y [i]|Y i−1)− I(M ;Z1[i]|Zn1,i+1)
]
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ; Y [i]|Y i−1, Zn1,i+1)− I(M ;Z1[i]|Y i−1, Zn1,i+1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[I(M ; Y [i]|U [i])− I(M ;Z1[i]|U [i])]
= n [I(M ; Y [Q]|U [Q], Q)− I(M ;Z1[Q]|U [Q], Q)]
= n [I(M,U [Q], Q; Y [Q]|U [Q], Q) − I(M,U [Q], Q;Z1[Q]|U [Q], Q)]
= n [I(V [Q]; Y [Q]|U [Q], Q)− I(V [Q];Z1[Q]|U [Q], Q)]
where (a) is due to the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner sum equality [4, Lemma 7], Q is a standard time-sharing
variable [9], and V [Q] := (M,U [Q], Q).
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Following (45) and (47), we have
n(R1 +R2 − ǫn) = H(M)− nǫn
≤ H(M)− [H(M |Y n) + I(M ;Zn2 )]
= I(M ; Y n)− I(M ;Zn2 )
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ; Y [i]|Y i−1)− I(M ;Z2[i]|Zn2,i+1)
]
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ; Y [i]|Y i−1, Zn2,i+1)− I(M ;Z2[i]|Y i−1, Zn2,i+1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1, Z
n
2,i+1; Y [i])− I(M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1, Zn2,i+1;Z2[i])
]
−
n∑
i=1
[
I(Y i−1, Zn2,i+1; Y [i])− I(Y i−1, Zn2,i+1;Z2[i])
]
−
n∑
i=1
[
I(Zn1,i+1; Y [i]|M,Y i−1, Zn2,i+1)− I(Zn1,i+1;Z2[i]|M,Y i−1, Zn2,i+1)
]
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1, Z
n
2,i+1; Y [i])− I(M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1, Zn2,i+1;Z2[i])
]
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1; Y [i])− I(M,Y i−1, Zn1,i+1;Z2[i])
]
=
n∑
i=1
[I(M,U [i]; Y [i])− I(M,U [i];Z2[i])]
= n [I(M,U [Q]; Y [Q]|Q)− I(M,U [Q];Z2[Q]|Q)]
= n [I(M,U [Q], Q; Y [Q])− I(M,U [Q], Q;Z2[Q])− (I(Y [Q];Q)− I(Z2[Q];Q))]
= n [I(V [Q]; Y [Q])− I(V [Q];Z2[Q])− (I(Y [Q];Q)− I(Z2[Q];Q))]
(e)
≤ n [I(V [Q]; Y [Q])− I(V [Q];Z2[Q])]
where (b) follows from the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner sum equality [4, Lemma 7], (c) is due to the Markov
chain (19), (d) is due to the Markov chain (12), and (e) follows again from the Markov chain
(19) and the fact that the channel is memoryless.
Finally, we complete the proof of the theorem by letting U := (U [Q], Q), V := V [Q],
X := X [Q], Y := Y [Q], Z1 := Z1[Q], Z2 := Z2[Q] and n→∞.
B Proof of Theorem 4
As shown in Theorem 3, when we have the Markov chains (12) and (19), there exists a random
triple (U, V,X) satisfying the Markov chain U → V → X → (Y, Z1, Z2) and such that R1 ≤
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I(V ; Y |U)− I(V ;Z1|U) and R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z2). In fact, the sum rate R1 +R2 can
be further bounded from above as
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V,X ; Y )− I(V,X ;Z2)− [I(X ; Y |V )− I(X ;Z2|V )]
(a)
= I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z2)− [I(X ; Y |V )− I(X ;Z2|V )]
(b)
≤ I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z2)
where (a) follows from the Markov chain V → X → (Y, Z2), and (b) follows from the Markov
chain (19) so I(X ; Y |V ) ≥ I(X ;Z2|V ).
When we further have the Markov chain (20), R1 can be further bounded from above as
R1 ≤ I(U, V ; Y )− I(U, V ;Z1|U)− [I(U ; Y )− I(U ;Z1)]
(c)
= I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z1)− [I(U ; Y )− I(U ;Z1)]
(d)
≤ I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z1)
= I(V,X ; Y )− I(V,X ;Z1)− [I(X ; Y |V )− I(X ;Z1|V )]
(e)
≤ I(V,X ; Y )− I(V,X ;Z1)
(f)
= I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z1)
where (c) follows from the Markov chain U → V → (Y, Z1), (d) and (e) follow from the
Markov chain (20) so I(U ; Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z1) and I(X ; Y |V ) ≥ I(X ;Z1|V ), and (f) follows from
the Markov chain V → X → (Y, Z1). This completes the proof of the theorem.
C Existence of an H with Ψ(H) = 0
To show that there exists a parity-check matrix H such that Ψ(H) = 0, it is sufficient to show
that EΨ(H) < 1 where EX denotes the expectation of a random variable X .
Let
Ψ0(H) :=
{
1, rank(H) < n(1− α2 − ǫ)
0, otherwise
and
Ψi(H,Γ) :=
{
1, Di(Γ) < n(1− αi − ǫ)− 3/ǫ
0, otherwise
for i = 1, 2. By the union bound, we have
EΨ(H) ≤ EΨ0(H) +
2∑
i=1
∑
Γ⊆{1,...,n}
|Γ|=nαi
EΨi(H,Γ). (48)
By [5, Lemma 6],
EΨ0(H) ≤ n(1 − α2 − ǫ)2
−n(α2+ǫ)
1− 2−n(α2+ǫ) <
1
2
(49)
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for sufficiently large n. By [5, Lemma 5], for any Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that |Γ| = nαi
EΨi(H,Γ) ≤ 2−3n+n(1−αi−ǫ) ≤ 2−2n.
Since the total number of different subsets of {1, . . . , n} is 2n, we have
2∑
i=1
∑
Γ⊆{1,...,n}
|Γ|=nαi
EΨi(H,Γ) ≤ 2 · 2n · 2−2n = 2−n+1 < 1
2
(50)
for n > 2. Substituting (49) and (50) into (48) proves that EΨ(H) < 1 for sufficiently large n
and hence completes the proof.
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